Rare Vacatur in Arbitration Appeal

I've been involved in a number of arbitrations in my career, both as lead counsel at the hearing stage and in post-hearing proceedings challenging the award.  I've learned to tell clients that the time to win the case is at the arbitration hearing, because the chances of getting a trial judge or an appellate panel to change the outcome later are slim.

The Dallas Court of Appeals recently declined to rubber stamp an arbitration result in Alim v. KBR (Kellogg, Brown & Root)-Halliburton (No. 05-09-00395-CV).  The Court vacated an award under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) because " the arbitrator failed to disclose facts which might, to an objective observer, create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator's partiality."  More specifically, he did not reveal that he had served as an arbitrator in a prior case involving KBR's party representative and a related company.

Disputing discusses the case in more detail here.

CCA Overrules Clewis's Factual Sufficiency Review

Publisher's Note:  The following is Brandy Wingate's first post on this blog.  Please join me in welcoming Brandy to the blogosphere!

In a splintered decision in Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overruled Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), which provided for review of a jury verdict in a criminal case for factual sufficiency of the evidence.  Judge Hervey wrote the plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, joined by Presiding Judge Keller and Judges Keasler and Cochran.  Despite joining the plurality, Judge Cochran also filed a concurring opinion, in which Judge Womack joined.  Judge Price filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Judges Meyers, Johnson, and Holcomb.

Judge Hervey’s opinion begins by stating that the Court was called consider whether “there is any meaningful distinction between a legal-sufficiency standard under Jackson v. Virginia and a factual-sufficiency standard under Clewis v. State and whether there is a need to retain both standards.”  Judge Hervey concluded that “these two standards have become essentially the same standard and that there is no meaningful distinction between them that would justify retaining them both.”  Thus, the plurality would overrule Clewis and hold that “the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Judge Hervey wrote that the distinction between these two standards was supposed to be that in a legal sufficiency review, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, while in a factual sufficiency review, the court views the evidence in a “neutral light.”  Judge Hervey noted that Clewis, however, required reviewing courts to afford “’appropriate deference’ to the jury's credibility and weight determinations.”  Judge Hervey concluded that, by requiring “appropriate deference” to a jury’s credibility and weight determinations while also requiring a neutral review of the facts, Clewis’s factual-sufficiency standard was contradictory and “barely distinguishable” from the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard.

Judge Cochran’s concurrence expressed the view that adopting Clewis in the first place was a misguided attempt to apply civil standards of evidentiary sufficiency to criminal cases, which require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  “The evidence in this case is either sufficient to support appellant's conviction under the constitutionally-mandated Jackson standard or it is not.  It cannot be ‘semi-sufficient.’”  Thus, Judge Cochran and Judge Womack agreed that “it is time to consign the civil-law concept of factual sufficiency review in criminal cases to the dustbin of history.”  The result:  five members of the court agreed that Clewis has no place in Texas jurisprudence, and factual sufficiency review is dead.

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Exciting Announcements to Begin 2011

These are exciting times for my firm, the Smith Law Group.

As we ring in the new year and celebrate this blog's fourth anniversary today, I am pleased to announce that Brandy Wingate (pictured) has joined the practice.  With this addition, the firm has established a second office in the Rio Grande Valley.

Brandy joins us after serving four years as the senior staff attorney to Thirteenth Court of Appeals Justice Gina Benavides.  Before that, Brandy was an associate in Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C.'s appellate practice group and a law clerk to former Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas R. Phillips. She is a board-certified civil appellate specialist and also is experienced in criminal appeals.

The firm will continue to focus on appellate matters and  providing litigation support to trial lawyers.  Having Brandy on board and adding a presence in the Valley will enable us to better serve clients statewide.

As we reflect on 2010 and plan for 2011, here are some of my favorite posts from the past year: