Texas Appellate Lawyer & Attorney : D. Todd Smith Law Firm : Appeals, Sanctions, Summary Judgment : Austin, Texas

The blogosphere has been a little slow catching on to yesterday's SCOTUS decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. (06-989).  Aside from my own post, here are the blog entries I have found discussing the case:

• Adjunct Law Prof Blog, which opines that parties to a collective bargaining agreement can still alter the standard of judicial review because they are governed by 29 U.S.C. § 1985 (Section 301) and common law, rather than the FAA.
  
• Blawgletter, which surmises that the decision might re-focus attention on the arbitration process itself and mentions that parties who remain concerned about an arbitrator "going off the reservation" might consider adopting an arbitration appeal procedure.
  
• Federal Civil Practice Bulletin, which summarizes the majority opinion.
  
• Northwest Business Litigation Blog, which does the same.
  
• SCOTUSwiki, which has a lot of background information on the case.
  
• Supreme Court of Texas Blog, which focuses on how the case may affect Bison Building Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge (No. 06-1084), a case currently pending in the Texas Supreme Court—and rightly points out that Hall Street may be flying under the radar because it was issued the same day as "the much sexier Medellin v. Texas decision."
  
• WorkPlace Prof Blog, which found the outcome surprising and somewhat troubling because it might restrict contracting parties' ability to bargain for procedural protections not specifically addressed in the FAA.

I will supplement this list as new discussions come to my attention.

3/27/08 update with additional links:

• ADR Prof Blog
• ADR Prof Blog (follow-up)
• Disputing
• LawMemo Arbitration Blog
• National Arbitration Forum Blog

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In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. (06-989) (previously discussed here), the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a contract purporting to allow judicial review of an arbitration award for evidentiary and legal errors cannot be enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Although this decision shutters the notion that parties can contract for expanded judicial review under the FAA, it does not preclude enforcement of such agreements under state law.  The key is whether the underlying agreement "involves commerce"—something the Hall Street parties did not litigate—and thereby triggers the federal statute.  Thus, in an effort to preserve existing agreements for enhanced review, parties will contend that state arbitration law applies.  Going forward, contracting parties will more likely turn to "arbitration appellate panels," building a level of review into the arbitration process before reaching any potential judicial remedies.

In vehemently defending the narrow statutory bases for vacating arbitration awards, Hall Street muddies the water with respect to whether judicially created vacatur grounds such as "manifest disregard of the law" and "violation of public policy" remain valid.  Those grounds were not squarely at issue—manifest disregard is mentioned in the majority opinion, but public policy is not—yet the Court describes the FAA bases for vacatur and modification as "exclusive."  Federal and state courts applying the FAA will face these issues in the near future.

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With last week's orders, the Texas Supreme Court decided five cases, four of which involved per curiam opinions.

In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, the Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to raise fact issues sufficient to preclude summary judgment.  Reversing a divided court of appeals for failure to apply the proper standard of review, the Court rendered judgment that the plaintiff take nothing.

In In re Allied Chemical Corporation, a divided Court conditionally granted mandamus relief to defendants in a mass-tort case set for trial even though the plaintiffs had never identified medical experts who could connect their diseases to the defendants' products.  The Court determined that the trial setting was premature and that mandamus was appropriate (1) to avoid a "monumental waste of judicial resources," (2) because the trial setting effectively denied discovery going to the heart of the defendants' case, and (3) because the setting severely compromised the defendants' ability to present any case at all at trial.  Justice Hecht concurred, and Chief Justice Jefferson (joined by Justices O'Neill, Wainwright, and Johnson) and Justice Wainwright each issued dissenting opinions.

In Kallam v. Boyd, theCourt withdrew its previous order granting the defendants' petitions and denied the petitions as improvidently granted because the plaintiff died shortly before oral argument.  Under the circumstances, the Court decided not to address the constitutional issue on which the court of appeals' decision turned:  whether the Texas Constitution's Open Courts provision precluded application of the statute of limitations to bar claims before the plaintiff reasonably could have discovered them.

In Brinson Ford, Inc. v. Alger, the Court held that the plaintiff, who fell from a pedestrian ramp at an auto dealership, presented no evidence of a premises condition posing an unreasonable risk of harm.  The Court reversed and rendered judgment for the dealership.

In In re Allstate County Mutual Insurance Co., the Court conditionally granted mandamus relief to an insurer and agent bombarded with a total of 213 discovery requests (89 requests for production, 59 interrogatories, and 65 requests for admission) in a third party car-wreck case.

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