Extensions of Time in the Fifth Circuit

Let's be honest.  Most state-court appellate practitioners find the Fifth Circuit a little byzantine.  But one thing the Fifth Circuit does right is allow the clerk's office to grant short unopposed briefing extensions—up to 15 days—over the telephone.  The circuit court has even done away with the requirement that the requesting counsel send a confirmation letter to the clerk, with a copy to all parties.

Briefing extensions are pretty easy to come by in state appellate courts, but they're not just a phone call away.  I can think of one or two other federal rules that the Texas Supreme Court ought to consider emulating when considering future rules changes.  For example, why not adopt some variation of FRAP 28.1 to deal with cross-appeals?

Extensions of Time in the Third Court

Dealing with the ever-present problem of conflicting deadlines, I recently filed a motion for extension of time to file a reply brief in the Third Court of Appeals here in Austin.  My opponent kindly agreed to a 30-day extension, which I determined would be more than sufficient to get the brief done and manage my other cases.

Several days later, I was surprised to receive a notice from the Court that my motion had been granted "in part" and that I would be receiving an additional 20 days—rather than the 30 I had asked for—to file my brief.

I happened to speak to a long-time acquaintance in the clerk's office today, and he explained that the Court is tightening up on extensions somewhat.  In the past, the clerk's office had authority to grant first and second extensions for up to 90 days total.  That authority has been scaled back to 60 days—apparently in an effort to keep the Court's docket moving.  Further extensions are possible, but will require that one of the justices grant the additional time.

I don't quite understand this move.  From everything I've seen and heard, the speed at which documents are coming in isn't an issue; it's the pace at which decisions are being put out.  Nevertheless, Third Court practitioners should be aware that the extensions we so often take for granted might not be as certain under this new policy.

Texas Supreme Court Orders & Opinions 11/30/07

The Texas Supreme Court handed down six decisions with this week's orders.

In Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Ademaj (No. 05-0016), a declaratory judgment action, the Court held that insurers may lawfully collect Texas Automobile Theft Prevention Authority fees from auto insurance policyholders without including such fees in rate filings required under Article 5.101 of the Insurance Code.  Because the trial court and court of appeals concluded otherwise, the supreme court reversed and rendered judgment that plaintiff take nothing.  Justice O'Neill (joined by Justice Medina) issued a concurring opinion.

In Houston Municipal Employees Pension System v. Ferrell (No. 05-0587), the Court held that 29 members of the Pension System could not bring a declaratory judgment action to adjudicate their rights under the statute that created the System.  Because the statute expressly provides that the administrative agency's interpretation is "final and binding on any interested party," the Court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case, reversed the court of appeals' judgment, and dismissed for want of jurisdiction.  Justice Brister (joined by Justice O'Neill) concurred.

In Montgomery County, Texas v. Park (No. 05-1023), the Court defined an "adverse" personnel action under the Texas Whistleblower Act (which provides no definition) as one that "would be likely to dissuade a reasonable, similarly situated worker from making a report under the Act."  Concluding thatplaintiff failed to meet that definition, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and rendered judgment for the County.

In Ogletree v. Matthews (No. 06-0502), the Court determined that a defendant in a health-care liability action has no right to an immediate interlocutory appeal when the trial court denies a motion to dismiss and grants the claimant a 30-day extension of time to cure defects in otherwise timely served expert reports.  Because the court of appeals reached the same conclusion, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's judgment.  Justice Willett delivered a concurring opinion.

In Best Buy Co. v. Barrera (No. 07-0028) (per curiam), a class action in which plaintiffs sought return of restocking fees, the Court followed its recent decision in Stonebridge Life Insurance Co. v. Pitts andconcluded that individual issues will predominate over common issues of proof.  Holding that plaintiffs thus failed to satisfy TRCP 42(b)(3)'s predominance requirement, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment affirming the class-certification order and remanded the case to the trial court.

In In re McKee (No. 06-0055) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam), the Court denied a mandamus petition seeking to invalidate an administrative judge's assignment of one trial judge to hear a recusal motion involving another trial judge when the administrative judge had previously recused himself from the case.  Noting that it had previously declined mandamus relief from the denial of a recusal motion, the Court applied the updated Prudential standard and concluded that there would be no significant benefit to granting relief in this case.