Texas Appellate Lawyer & Attorney : D. Todd Smith Law Firm : Appeals, Sanctions, Summary Judgment : Austin, Texas

The Texas Supreme Court issued four new decisions and one substituted opinion with today's regular orders.

In General Electric Co. v. Moritz (No. 0871), the Court reaffirmed that a landowner owes an independent contractor’s employees no duty to warn of obvious hazards they already know about, rejecting the plaintiff's argument that his knowledge of the hazard was simply a factor for the jury to consider in assessing comparative negligence.  Justice Green (joined by Chief Justice Jefferson and Justice Johnson) dissented.

In Frymire Engineering Co. v. Jomar International, Ltd. (No. 06-0755), the Court held that the subrogation doctrine applies to a subcontractor seeking to recover contractual payments from alleged third-party tortfeasors, provided the doctrine's traditional requirements are satisfied. 

In Leland v. Brandal (No. 06-1028), a health-care liability case, the Court determined that a plaintiff may receive a 30-day extension to cure a deficient expert report after a ruling that the report is adequate has been reversed on appeal.  Justice Brister dissented. 

In Kao Holdings, L.P. v. Young (No. 07-0197) (per curiam), a restricted appeal, the Court reversed a default judgment granted against an individual who was not named as party to the suit, modified the judgment, and affirmed as modified.

In Evanston Insurance Co. v. ATOFINA Petrochemicals, Inc. (No. 03-0647), the Court denied the motions for rehearing, withdrew its February 15, 2008 opinion and judgment (which were themselves issued on rehearing), and issued a substitute opinion reaching mostly the same result.  Rather than render a complete judgment, however, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on some of the insured's claims for attorney's fees and its prejudgment interest claim.

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The Texas Supreme Court decided six cases and issued one substituted opinion with this week's orders.  Briefly, the new decisions are:

• First American Title Insurance Co. v. Combs (No. 05-0541), affirming the Comptroller's interpretation of a retaliatory tax statute affecting foreign insurers.
  
  
• In re McAllen Medical Center (No. 05-0892) (orig. proceeding), holding that appellate courts may review the adequacy of expert reports required by the Medical Liability Act when the statute's purposes would otherwise be defeated.  The Court conditionally granted the writ and ordered the trial court to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims against the hospital.
  
  
• Canyon Regional Water Authority v. Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority (No. 06-0873), deciding a state water authority's easement rights involving a lake.
  
  
• In re Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. (No. 06-0886) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam), concluding that removing a case to federal court before filing an answer did not waive the defendants' right to arbitration.  Compare Perry Homes v. Cull (No. 05-0882), previously discussed here.
  
  
• Higgins v. Randall County Sheriff's Office (No. 06- 0917), holding that an uncontested affidavit of indigence entitled the appellant to pursue his appeal without advance payment of costs.
  
  
• City of Dallas v. Reed (No. 07-0469) (per curiam), determining that a two-inch variance between traffic lanes was neither a special defect nor a premises defect for purposes of the Tort Claims Act.

I expect we'll see some lively discussion of McAllen Medical Center, Citigroup, and Reed in the coming days.

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In Austin Periodontal Associates, Inc. v. Husak (No. 03-07-00125-CV), a pre-House Bill 4 dental malpractice case, the Third Court of Appeals has affirmed a $503,923 judgment rendered after a jury trial.  The dentist and hisemployer challenged the judgment on several grounds, most of which involved evidentiary complaints.  This decision is noteworthy, however, because the trial court refused the defendants' proposed "bad result" instruction under former Article 4590i, Section 7.02:

A finding of negligence may not be based solely on evidence of bad result to the patient in question, but such a bad result may be considered by you, along with other evidence, in determining the issue of negligence; you shall be the sole judge of the weight, if any, to be given any such evidence.

Section 7.02 was limited to jury trials "involving a health care liability claim against a physician or hospital."  The court of appeals concluded that no abuse of discretion occurred in Husak because the dentist presented no evidence that he was a "physician," and his employer presented no evidence that it was a "hospital," as the former statute defined those terms.

The current version, Section 74.303(e) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, mandates a "bad result" instruction in "any action on a health care liability claim that is tried by a jury."  The jury may or may not have reached the same result had it been instructed under the current law, but the trial court could not have refused the instruction.

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The Texas Supreme Court handed down six decisions with this week's orders.

In Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Ademaj (No. 05-0016), a declaratory judgment action, the Court held that insurers may lawfully collect Texas Automobile Theft Prevention Authority fees from auto insurance policyholders without including such fees in rate filings required under Article 5.101 of the Insurance Code.  Because the trial court and court of appeals concluded otherwise, the supreme court reversed and rendered judgment that plaintiff take nothing.  Justice O'Neill (joined by Justice Medina) issued a concurring opinion.

In Houston Municipal Employees Pension System v. Ferrell (No. 05-0587), the Court held that 29 members of the Pension System could not bring a declaratory judgment action to adjudicate their rights under the statute that created the System.  Because the statute expressly provides that the administrative agency's interpretation is "final and binding on any interested party," the Court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case, reversed the court of appeals' judgment, and dismissed for want of jurisdiction.  Justice Brister (joined by Justice O'Neill) concurred.

In Montgomery County, Texas v. Park (No. 05-1023), the Court defined an "adverse" personnel action under the Texas Whistleblower Act (which provides no definition) as one that "would be likely to dissuade a reasonable, similarly situated worker from making a report under the Act."  Concluding thatplaintiff failed to meet that definition, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and rendered judgment for the County.

In Ogletree v. Matthews (No. 06-0502), the Court determined that a defendant in a health-care liability action has no right to an immediate interlocutory appeal when the trial court denies a motion to dismiss and grants the claimant a 30-day extension of time to cure defects in otherwise timely served expert reports.  Because the court of appeals reached the same conclusion, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's judgment.  Justice Willett delivered a concurring opinion.

In Best Buy Co. v. Barrera (No. 07-0028) (per curiam), a class action in which plaintiffs sought return of restocking fees, the Court followed its recent decision in Stonebridge Life Insurance Co. v. Pitts andconcluded that individual issues will predominate over common issues of proof.  Holding that plaintiffs thus failed to satisfy TRCP 42(b)(3)'s predominance requirement, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment affirming the class-certification order and remanded the case to the trial court.

In In re McKee (No. 06-0055) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam), the Court denied a mandamus petition seeking to invalidate an administrative judge's assignment of one trial judge to hear a recusal motion involving another trial judge when the administrative judge had previously recused himself from the case.  Noting that it had previously declined mandamus relief from the denial of a recusal motion, the Court applied the updated Prudential standard and concluded that there would be no significant benefit to granting relief in this case.

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The Texas Supreme Court issued one opinion with today's orders.  In Yancy v. United Surgical Partners Inc. (05-0925), a summary judgment case, the Court held that the two-year statute of limitations in the former Medical Liability Act did not violate the Texas Constitution's open courts guarantee on the record presented.  Although the Court concluded that the court of appeals erred because the record contained some evidence of continuous mental incapacity, it nevertheless affirmed after concluding that the petitioner failed to raise a "fact issue establishing that [petitioner] did not have a reasonable opportunity to discover the alleged wrong and bring suit within the limitations period or that she sued within a reasonable time after discovering the alleged wrong.  Thus, the open courts provision does not save [petitioner's] time-barred negligence claims."

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The Texas Supreme Court issued a single per curiam decision with today's orders.

In Schaub v. Sanchez, the Court held that a patient's mere lack of consent to a medical procedure did not support a cause of action for lack of informed consent under the former Medical Liability Act (now codified at Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code) because that statute applies only if a doctor negligently fails to disclose the procedure's risks or hazards to the patient.  Here, the plaintiff did not complain that she was unaware of the risks or hazards; indeed, she had undergone the same procedure twice before.  The plaintiff might have had a battery or negligence claim, but those claims were dismissed by agreed order and were not before the Court.  Accordingly, the Court rendered judgment that the plaintiff take nothing.

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In Baize v. Scott & White Clinic, a health care liability case, the Third Court of Appeals has affirmed a no-evidence summary judgment based on the plaintiffs' failure to timely designate expert witnesses.  Although the trial court erred by granting a motion to withdraw as counsel that failed to state the expert designation deadline, the court of appeals held the error harmless because the plaintiffs had sufficient time to secure new counsel and for the new counsel to investigate the case and prepare for trial.

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